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Verified Theory · Book 3 · v1.8.0

Cash Format Transitions
how your strategy shifts when the format changes

Five parameters are built into every Cash game our solver was trained on — ante, blind structure, table size, stack depth, and rake. We swept each one against the Cash 1.1.0 baseline, measured the deltas, and identified the mechanisms. Here's what to adjust before you sit down.

9 mechanisms identified · 5 compound interactions tested · 36 query batches
About this book

The game you practiced isn't always the game you play

A Cash NLHE player who learned the game at 6-max, 100bb, no ante, 3% rake sits down at a 9-max table with a 2bb ante, deep stacks, a straddle, and 5% juice. Which adjustments are real — and which are noise? This book answers that question by sweeping five trained parameters against the Cash 1.1.0 baseline and measuring the behavioral deltas our solver actually produces.

The five parameters — ante, blind structure (2-blind vs 3-blind straddle), table size, stack depth, and rake — are all axes the model was trained to condition on. Every delta comes from querying the same converged Cash model at different parameter settings, not from interpolation or theory alone. Thirty-six query batches, nine named mechanisms, and five cross-axis compound tests reveal which parameters amplify each other and which operate independently.

The synthesis chapter covers all five interactions directly. Most striking — ante and table size amplify each other rather than adding linearly. At 9-max with a 2bb ante, BTN raise size jumps to 60bb average versus 17.4bb at 6-max. At the end, per-chapter rules of thumb distill the findings into practical adjustments.

Methodology

Every finding was produced by querying the same converged Cash model (universal-dense-v4 family) at different trained parameter settings — not a different model per format. The model conditions on ante, blind count, table size, stack depth, and rake as continuous or categorical inputs. All five axes are within the training range and were confirmed to produce detectable, monotonic strategy responses via a pre-campaign signal-probe sweep.

When a sentence explains why a pattern exists — appealing to concepts like dead-money pull, MDF compression, SPR dynamics, or call-suppression polarization — it is prefixed with "Based on general poker theory". This tells you the reasoning is grounded in widely accepted poker concepts, not a direct solver measurement. Every unmarked sentence is a direct data observation.

Two known anomalies are documented and excluded from theory claims. The 2%/2cap rake configuration produces anomalous widening inconsistent with surrounding configs — this row is excluded and all rake conclusions use 0%/3%/5% only. The river-bet direction reversal at 5% rake contradicts the predicted direction; the mechanism hypothesis is documented but not labeled confirmed. Deep-stack findings (600bb) carry lower confidence pending source-level confirmation of the training distribution shape.

The mechanism map

How each parameter cascades into strategy

Ante · Dead money

Dead-money pull

Antes create forced dead money that all positions compete for. VPIP rises at every position — UTG 17% → 57%, BTN 43% → 97% across the 0→2.5bb sweep. Limping emerges above 0.5bb ante and dominates above 2bb, when entering for 1bb to compete for a large pre-action pot becomes the primary entry vehicle.

Ante · Position gradient

Positional dead-money dilution

The ante-widening effect is strongest at BTN, weakest at UTG. BTN gains +54pp across the full ante sweep; UTG gains only +40pp. BTN must survive just the two blinds to capture the ante pool; UTG must survive five players behind it.

Blind structure · Straddle

Straddle squeeze suppression

In 3-blind games, BTN drops −14.4pp VPIP at 0bb ante (43.3% → 28.9%). The straddle posts 2bb and acts last preflop, creating a squeeze threat on every BTN open. To open profitably BTN must size to 14.5bb avg — three times the 2-blind standard. UTG/MP/CO widen slightly: the straddle adds dead money relative to their open cost.

Table size · UTG

MDF compression

UTG VPIP contracts monotonically with table size from 28.4% (4-max) to 11.0% (9-max). Each additional opponent behind UTG raises the probability that at least one holds a dominating hand. BTN is range-bound 43–50% across all table sizes ≥4-max, because it always faces only the two blinds regardless of table size.

Table size · Sizing

Open-sizing convention collapse

At 9-max the standard open is a min-raise (2.2bb avg at BTN) versus 4.8bb at 6-max. Prior folds reveal weaker remaining ranges, so a smaller size achieves the same fold equity. The 3-max BTN anomaly — 43.6%, tighter than 4-max (45.9%) — results from an elevated 3-bet threat (24.9%) with no prior-fold information.

Depth · C-bet

SPR-driven c-bet attenuation

C-bet frequency drops with depth on all tested boards. K72r falls from 83.6% (100bb) to 68.3% (600bb); T98 from 65.0% to 46.4%; K94ss from 32.2% to 22.9%. Higher SPR forces check-back of marginal hands as the opponent has room to maneuver postflop. The drop is largest on dry boards, smallest on monotone boards.

Depth · River

Overbet unlock at deep stacks

River avg bet size on the K72r runout jumps from 25.5bb (100bb) to 54.4bb (600bb) — a structural discontinuity between 400bb and 600bb. Below 400bb avg bet stays 18–30bb. Above 400bb, clean 2× pot bets become callable actions and both value and bluff benefit from maximum sizing. River bet frequency also rises continuously, from 60.3% to 82.2%.

Rake · Preflop

Call-suppression and 3-bet polarization

At 5% rake, BB call% drops −10.2pp (39.2% → 29.0%) and 3-bet% rises +2.4pp (12.6% → 15.0%). Marginal calls become EV-negative as rake eats the thin breakeven margin. These hands migrate to fold or 3-bet — the 3-bet avoids the flop rake charge when it induces a fold.

Rake · C-bet

C-bet polarization under rake

At 5% rake, c-bet drops on dry boards (K72r −6.5pp, A94r −7.4pp) but rises on T98 (+5.6pp). On dry boards, thin continuation bets become unprofitable when the caller can realize equity across streets. On T98 the opener shifts to a pure value-bet strategy — fewer hands, each strong enough to justify the rake cost.

Intro

Formats Primer

Why this book exists

A solver trained on 6-max, 100bb, no-ante Cash NLHE does not give you the right strategy for a 3-blind bomb-pot game, a 200bb deep game, or a 9-max table with 5% rake. Those aren't small adjustments — they're different games. This book measures exactly how much strategy shifts as each parameter moves, using signal-probe data from the same solver the app runs in production.

This chapter exists because GAME-RULES.md is a researcher's reference document: field names, CUDA source citations, trained ranges. It's not a reader's introduction. Before you absorb 100+ data points across five chapters, you need to know what the five axes actually are, what the baseline represents, and what scale of change to expect.


The baseline: Cash 1.1.0

Every delta in this book is measured against a single reference point called Cash 1.1.0. This is the QuintAce solver's default 6-max cash game configuration:

Parameter Value Plain English
Table size 6 players UTG, MP, CO, BTN, SB, BB
Blind structure 2 blinds Standard SB + BB; no straddle
Ante 0 bb No antes — only the two blinds post dead money
Stacks 100 bb each Everyone starts the hand equally deep
Rake 3% of pot, 3bb cap Standard online rate; no-flop-no-drop

When a chapter says "BTN opens 43%," that is the BTN's VPIP at Cash 1.1.0. When a chapter says "at 2bb ante, BTN opens 96%," the +53pp change is the ante's contribution.


The five axes

Axis 1 — Ante (0 to 2.5 bb)

An ante is dead money posted by every player before cards are dealt. Unlike blinds, antes are posted equally — the pot is pre-built before anyone acts. The result: entering the pot becomes cheap relative to what you can win, so ranges widen dramatically. At 2.5bb ante, CO plays 3× its baseline range.

The boundary of this book's trained range is 2.5 bb. Above 3.5 bb, the format router switches to Splash (a different format entirely). There is no claim about strategy above 2.5 bb ante.

Axis 2 — Blind structure (2-blind vs 3-blind)

2-blind is the standard structure: SB posts 0.5bb, BB posts 1bb. 3-blind adds a straddle: the UTG player posts 2bb before cards are dealt and acts last preflop. The straddle creates two simultaneous effects — more dead money (like an ante) and a live option (the straddler can re-open action). The dominant effect is on BTN, which drops from 43% to 29% VPIP because BTN now risks being squeezed by the live straddle.

This axis is a binary toggle — the solver does not model positional straddle variants (button straddle, Mississippi straddle) separately. "3-blind" in this book always means UTG straddle, seat 2.

Axis 3 — Table size (2 to 9 players)

Table size determines how many opponents you face and how far you are from the button. The biggest effect is on early position: UTG plays 28% VPIP at 4-max and 11% at 9-max — a 17pp tightening — because there are more opponents who can have you dominated. BTN stays rangebound (43–50% across 4/6/8/9-max) because its positional advantage is structural regardless of table size.

Positions that exist at 6-max (UTG, MP, CO, BTN, SB, BB) collapse at smaller tables. At 3-max, there is no "CO" — there is only BTN, SB, and BB.

Axis 4 — Stack depth (20 to 600 bb)

Stack depth controls how many streets of betting fit in a hand, which drives the value of implied odds, the danger of calling preflop, and the frequency of aggression postflop. At 50bb, a standard c-bet commits 30% of your stack. At 200bb, the same c-bet commits 7.5% — you have much more room to maneuver postflop, but you also risk a much larger amount on big hands.

Preflop, deeper stacks push BTN VPIP slightly wider (+6pp from 100bb to 600bb) because implied odds improve. Postflop, deeper stacks cause c-bet frequency to collapse (CO on K72r: 90% at 50bb → 68% at 600bb) because the SPR is too high to build in a pot you can't comfortably commit.

Axis 5 — Rake (0% to 5%)

Rake is the house's share of each pot, taken as a percentage capped at a fixed BB amount. At 3%/3bb, a 30bb pot yields 0.9bb of rake before winnings are distributed. Rake applies only when a flop is dealt (no-flop-no-drop). The key consequence: rake penalizes marginal preflop calls (you pay to see a flop that may not be profitable enough to offset the rake) and reduces postflop aggression (smaller expected value on thin c-bets means checking up is better).

The interaction with depth matters: at very deep stacks, pots quickly exceed the cap, so effective rake rate declines as stacks get deeper.


What each axis moves, at a glance

From signal-probe data (2026-04-12):

Axis Metric Low → High Change
Ante (0 → 2.5bb) CO open VPIP 28% → 85% +57pp
Blind structure (2-blind → 3-blind) BTN VPIP 43% → 29% −14pp
Table size (4-max → 9-max) UTG VPIP 28% → 11% −17pp
Stack depth (100bb → 600bb postflop) CO c-bet K72r 90% → 68% −22pp
Rake (0% → 5% preflop) BB call vs CO 2.5x 39% → 29% −10pp

Ante is the largest single-axis effect. Table size and blind structure have the next largest preflop impact. Stack depth dominates postflop decisions. Rake is meaningful but secondary — it dampens rather than redirects.


How this book is organized

Each chapter covers one axis in isolation, then combines with the others in Chapter 5:

Chapter Axis What you'll learn
Ch 1 Ante (0–2.5bb) When to limp, how sizing scales, BB defense thresholds
Ch 2 Table size (HU to 9-max) How UTG/BTN ranges compress and expand
Ch 3 Stack depth (20–600bb) SPR effects on preflop calling and postflop aggression
Ch 4 Rake (0%–5%) The cost of marginal calls and thin c-bets
Ch 5 Compound transitions Straddle + ante, deep + rake, and real-world format combinations

The baseline appears in every chapter. When a figure says "BTN +8pp from baseline," baseline is always Cash 1.1.0 unless the chapter header states otherwise.


What this book does not cover

Formats that are out of scope — not because they're unimportant, but because the solver routes them as distinct training families with different mechanisms:


Sources: GAME-RULES.md (ground truth), signal-probe log (c:/tmp/probe_axis_signals.out, 2026-04-12). All VPIP/frequency figures in this chapter come from the same probe run as Appendix A of GAME-RULES.md.

Ch 1

Ante & Blind Structure

Cash poker is not one game. Change the ante, add a straddle, and the equilibrium reshapes from the ground up. This chapter covers two axes that share a chapter because they interact directly: the ante (how much dead money sits in the pot before anyone acts) and the blind structure (whether a third forced bet — the straddle — exists).

Every number in this chapter is measured against the Cash 1.1.0 baseline: 6-max, 2-blind, no ante, 100bb effective stacks, 3% rake with a 3bb cap.

Measurement conditions: 6-max, 2-blind (no straddle), 100bb effective, rake=3%/3cap unless noted. Ante and blind structure vary as labeled.

1.1 Open VPIP across the ante sweep

The single largest effect in this book is the ante's pull on preflop ranges. Every position widens — and the widening is massive.

Open VPIP by position and ante level. 6-max · 2-blind · 100bb effective · rake=3%/3cap · ante sweeps columns

AnteUTGMPCOBTN
0 bb{{num:ch01.open_vpip.utg.0ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.mp.0ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.co.0ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.btn.0ante}}
0.25 bb{{num:ch01.open_vpip.utg.025ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.mp.025ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.co.025ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.btn.025ante}}
0.5 bb{{num:ch01.open_vpip.utg.05ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.mp.05ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.co.05ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.btn.05ante}}
1.0 bb{{num:ch01.open_vpip.utg.10ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.mp.10ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.co.10ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.btn.10ante}}
2.0 bb{{num:ch01.open_vpip.utg.20ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.mp.20ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.co.20ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.btn.20ante}}
2.5 bb{{num:ch01.open_vpip.utg.25ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.mp.25ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.co.25ante}}{{num:ch01.open_vpip.btn.25ante}}

Source: ch01-ante.md §1 — Open VPIP by position and ante

Open VPIP by position across six ante levels. 6-max · 2-blind · 100bb effective · rake=3%/3cap · ante sweeps columns

See preceding table for all data points.

Source: ch01-ante.md §1

UTG goes from 17.2% to 57.2% — more than tripling. BTN goes from 43.3% to 97.4%, playing nearly every hand dealt. The widening is monotonic at every position: more ante always means more hands played.

The effect is not uniform across positions. BTN widens +54pp over the full sweep. UTG widens +40pp. The gap between them grows as ante climbs. At zero ante, the BTN–UTG spread is about 26pp. At 2.5bb ante, the spread is 40pp.

Based on general poker theory Dead-money capture. Each player's ante contribution creates uncontested money in the pot. The open-raiser wins this pot on a fold — the larger the ante pool, the lower the hand quality needed to show a profit. BTN captures the pool most often because it faces only the two blinds; UTG captures it least often because five opponents can call or raise behind.
What this means in practice Your standard opening chart is obsolete in any game with a meaningful ante. At 1bb ante, CO is already playing 53% of hands — wider than BTN plays in a zero-ante game. At 2bb ante, every position is playing at least 50%.

1.2 Raise sizes grow with ante

Opening wider is only half the story. The solver also opens bigger as ante climbs.

Average raise size (bb) by position and ante level. 6-max · 2-blind · 100bb effective · ante sweeps columns

AnteCO avg raiseBTN avg raise
0 bb3.3bb4.8bb
0.25 bb5.0bb6.9bb
0.5 bb6.4bb8.2bb
1.0 bb7.8bb9.4bb
2.0 bb9.5bb13.8bb
2.5 bb11.4bb17.4bb

Source: ch01-ante.md §1 — Raise sizes (CO avg raise bb)

CO's average open goes from 3.3bb to 11.4bb across the sweep. BTN goes from 4.8bb to 17.4bb. These are not small adjustments — they are 3–4× the baseline sizing.

Based on general poker theory Pot-odds denial. When the pot is already large from antes, a standard 2.5bb open gives callers extraordinary odds. The opener must raise big enough to deny the rest of the table a cheap look at the flop. BTN sizes grow faster than CO because BTN is also pricing out the BB — who already has the best pot odds at the table — from profitably defending the enlarged pot.
What this means in practice If you open to 2.5bb in a 2bb ante game, you are giving away money. The pot already contains roughly 13.5bb of dead money in a 6-max game. Your raise needs to be proportional to that pot. Use the solver's sizing as your anchor: at 2bb ante, CO opens to about 9.5bb and BTN to about 13.8bb.

1.3 Limping is equilibrium — not a leak

This is the headline finding of the ante axis. At zero ante, the solver never limps. Above 0.5bb ante, limping appears. By 2.5bb ante, it dominates the opening strategy.

Limp% by position and ante level. 6-max · 2-blind · 100bb effective · ante sweeps columns

AnteUTG limp%MP limp%CO limp%BTN limp%
0 bb0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%
0.5 bb0.3%0.2%0.5%2.7%
1.0 bb11.3%10.1%16.3%50.3%
2.0 bb37.6%46.8%77.0%95.0%
2.5 bb50.8%63.1%83.7%95.9%

Source: ch01-ante.md §2 — Limp% by position and ante (2-blind)

At 1.0bb ante, BTN limps half the time. At 2.0bb ante, CO limps 77% and BTN limps 95%. This is not a model artifact. This is the equilibrium response to an inflated pot.

The per-hand composition confirms the story. At 1.0bb ante, the first hands to limp from CO are speculative implied-odds holdings: T9s, 98s, 87s, small pairs like 33 and 22, suited aces like A9s and A8s. These are hands that want to see a flop cheaply and can win big pots when they connect.

At 2.0bb ante, the limp range extends to the entire range including premiums. AA, KK, QQ, JJ, AKs, AKo — all classified as "notable limpers" from CO. When the dead money pool is large enough, even premium hands gain more from entering a multiway pot than from raising and folding everyone out.

Based on general poker theory Pot-odds equilibrium. At 2bb ante in a 6-max game, the pre-action pot is approximately 13.5bb before anyone voluntarily enters. Limping costs 1bb to see a flop in a pot that already offers roughly 13:1. Even hands with modest postflop equity clear this threshold comfortably. Raising, by contrast, narrows the field and wins a pot that was already large — leaving dead money behind. The equilibrium shifts: enter wide by limping; raise only when you specifically want isolation with a hand that benefits from heads-up play.
What this means in practice In a 2bb+ ante game, limping from every position is the primary entry vehicle. Open-raising is reserved for situations where you want to play heads-up — strong hands against specific opponents, or hands that benefit from a smaller field. If you see the whole table limping in a high-ante game, do not assume weak players. This is the correct strategy.

1.4 BB defense widens with ante — and shifts to 3-betting

BB defense against a CO 2.5bb open tells the same dead-money story from the defender's perspective.

BB defense vs CO 2.5bb open by ante level. 6-max · 2-blind · 100bb effective · ante sweeps columns

AnteDef%Fold%Call%Raise%
0 bb51.8%48.2%39.2%12.6%
0.25 bb76.5%23.5%61.5%14.9%
0.5 bb84.5%15.5%68.0%16.5%
1.0 bb88.1%11.9%66.6%21.5%
2.0 bb90.3%9.7%55.1%35.3%
2.5 bb91.2%8.8%51.9%39.3%

Source: ch01-ante.md §4 — BB defense vs CO 2.5bb open (2-blind)

At 2.5bb ante, BB defends 91.2% — nearly every hand. Fold% drops to 8.8%. Blind steals are nearly impossible.

There is a regime shift inside the defense action. At low ante (0–0.5bb), BB defends primarily by calling — 61.5% call at 0.25bb ante. At high ante (2.0–2.5bb), BB's 3-bet% climbs to 35–39%. The call% actually drops from 68% at 0.5bb to 51.9% at 2.5bb.

The explanation: with a massive pot already built, marginal calling hands become marginal 3-betting hands. The enlarged pot makes preflop squeezes profitable across a much wider range. BB stops passively calling and starts aggressively 3-betting to capture dead money before the flop.

What this means in practice In a high-ante game, do not expect to steal blinds. BB defends over 90% at 2bb+ ante. Adjust your open-raise profitability analysis: the money comes from postflop play, not from preflop folds. And prepare for 3-bets — BB is 3-betting 35–39% at 2.5bb ante, roughly 3× the baseline rate.

1.5 The 3-blind structure: straddle as positional modifier

Adding a third blind — a mandatory straddle posted by the UTG seat at 2bb — changes the game asymmetrically. BTN, which was last to act preflop in a 2-blind game, now has the straddler acting after it.

Open VPIP by position: 2-blind vs 3-blind at 0bb ante. 6-max · ante=0 · 100bb effective · blind structure sweeps columns

Position2-blind3-blindΔ
UTG17.2%20.0%+2.8pp
MP22.9%26.7%+3.8pp
CO28.1%30.6%+2.5pp
BTN43.3%28.9%−14.4pp

Source: ch01-ante.md §3 — Open VPIP: 2-blind vs 3-blind at ante=0

Open VPIP shift from 2-blind to 3-blind at zero ante. 6-max · ante=0 · 100bb effective · blind structure sweeps columns

See preceding table for all data points.

Source: ch01-ante.md §3

UTG, MP, and CO all widen slightly — each by about 2.5–3.8pp. The straddle adds dead money to the pot, which makes opening slightly more profitable from early and middle positions.

BTN moves in the opposite direction. It drops 14.4pp — from 43.3% to 28.9%. This is not a small adjustment. BTN in a straddled game is tighter than CO.

The reason is positional. In a 2-blind game, BTN is the last voluntary actor preflop. It opens with full information about who has folded ahead of it. In a 3-blind game, the straddler (seat 2, traditionally UTG) posts 2bb and acts last preflop — after BTN. BTN's open-raise now faces a squeeze threat from behind.

Based on general poker theory Squeeze-threat discount. The straddle retains the option to 3-bet over any BTN open. BTN's open-raise EV is discounted by the probability that the straddle squeezes. To compensate, BTN must either tighten its range to hands that can withstand a squeeze, or open much larger to price the straddle out. The solver does both.

BTN raise sizing confirms: BTN's average raise in 3-blind is 14.5bb at 0bb ante — versus 4.8bb in 2-blind. The 3× larger sizing is the cost of buying fold equity over the straddle. A small BTN open (4bb) gives the straddle excellent odds to call and squeeze on later streets. A large open (14bb+) prices out everything except the straddle's premium hands.

What this means in practice In a straddled game, treat BTN the way you would treat CO in a standard game. If you would fold that hand from CO in a no-straddle game, fold it from BTN when the straddle is live. And when you do open from BTN, size up dramatically — 3× your normal open is the starting point.

1.6 Ante × blind structure: opposing forces at BTN

What happens when both axes move at once? The cross-tabulation reveals a clean structural pattern.

BTN VPIP: 2-blind vs 3-blind across ante levels. 6-max · 100bb effective · BTN · ante and blind structure both vary

AnteBTN (2-blind)BTN (3-blind)Δ
0 bb43.3%28.9%−14.4pp
1.0 bb79.4%53.8%−25.6pp
2.0 bb96.4%74.7%−21.7pp
2.5 bb97.4%78.3%−19.1pp

Source: ch01-ante.md §3 — 3-blind ante × open VPIP

BTN VPIP: 2-blind vs 3-blind across ante levels. 6-max · 100bb effective · BTN · ante and blind structure both vary

See preceding table for all data points.

Source: ch01-ante.md §3

Ante and the straddle pull BTN in opposite directions. Ante widens it (dead money to capture). The straddle narrows it (squeeze threat). The two effects subtract rather than compound.

At 2.5bb ante, 2-blind BTN plays 97.4% — nearly every hand. 3-blind BTN at the same ante plays 78.3%. The gap never closes. Even at the highest ante level tested, the straddle suppresses BTN by about 19pp.

For UTG, MP, and CO, the picture is different: both ante and the straddle widen them. They compound. At 2.5bb ante in a 3-blind game, CO opens 66.8% and UTG opens above 44%.

The extreme at BTN: jam or fold. At 2.5bb ante + 3-blind, 19.1% of BTN opens are all-in. BTN's average raise in this configuration reaches 19.6bb. The dead money is so large that BTN either limps speculative hands or near-jams premium ones. Mid-size raises are ineffective because the straddle can call anything that is not close to all-in.

BB defense in 3-blind is already wide at zero ante — 75.5% (versus 51.8% in 2-blind). The straddle's forced 2bb adds dead money that BB must defend against. At 2.5bb ante + 3-blind, BB defense rises to 92.7%.

What this means in practice In a "big game" — high ante plus straddle — your BTN decisions simplify to three options: limp in with speculative hands, jam with premiums, or fold. There is no comfortable mid-range raise. Meanwhile, early and middle positions play very wide. The strategic weight shifts to postflop play, where the inflated pots create the real decision points.

What we didn't test in Ch 1

  • Ante sweep is six discrete points (0, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 2.5bb). Intermediate values (0.75, 1.5) are interpolated from the monotonic pattern — not directly measured. The ante axis is continuous in training, but we only queried these six levels.
  • 3-blind data at table sizes other than 6-max is not tested in this chapter. All 3-blind findings here are 6-max specific. The straddle's effect at 4-max or 9-max may differ in magnitude — see Ch 5 for cross-axis interaction data where it exists.
  • Ante × c-bet data in this chapter covers only K72r for the 2-blind case (c-bet saturates near 100% at 0.5bb+ ante on this board). The texture-dependent ante × c-bet story — where connected wet boards peak and then decline — is covered in Ch 1 §5b and referenced further in Ch 5.

Five practical adjustments

  1. Widen every position with ante. At 1bb ante, CO plays 53% and BTN plays 79%. At 2bb+ ante, UTG plays 51% — wider than CO at zero ante. Standard hand charts are obsolete above 0.5bb ante.
  2. Start limping above 0.5bb ante. Limping is equilibrium, not a mistake. At 1bb ante BTN limps half the time. At 2bb ante premiums limp too. Reserve the raise for hands that specifically benefit from isolation.
  3. Size up your opens. CO's average raise grows from 3.3bb to 11.4bb across the ante sweep. BTN goes from 4.8bb to 17.4bb. If you apply standard 2.5bb sizing in a high-ante game, you are giving the table a free look at the flop.
  4. In a straddled game, treat BTN as CO. BTN drops from 43.3% to 28.9% at zero ante. Open large (14bb+) or do not open speculative hands. UTG, MP, and CO widen slightly.
  5. Expect near-universal BB defense at 2bb+ ante. BB defends over 90% and 3-bets 35–39%. Blind steals are nearly impossible. Prepare for 3-bets and plan to make money postflop.

Research notes

Details for readers interested in the methodology behind the findings above. Skip this section if you just want the practical adjustments.

  • The ante × blind structure cross-tabulation (§1.6) is a re-analysis of the ch01 batch 01a data, not a separate dedicated batch. The 3-blind conditions were queried as part of the same ante sweep. The ante × blind interaction numbers are thus measured in the same session as the single-axis data, which eliminates cross-session variance as a confounder but does not constitute an independent replication.
  • The 19.1% all-in rate at BTN in 3-blind + 2.5bb ante is a direct batch output from ch01_ante_opens. It is not derived from the raise-size distribution — it is the fraction of BTN opening actions classified as all-in. The corresponding average raise (19.6bb) includes these all-in actions in the average, which pulls the mean upward. The non-all-in portion of BTN's opens in this configuration clusters around 14–15bb, consistent with the 3-blind sizing convention.
  • Premium-hand limping at 2bb+ ante (AA, KK, QQ, JJ, AKs, AKo classified as "notable limpers") is documented in the per-hand composition data from batch 01d, re-queried and verified on 2026-04-16. This behavior was not predicted by the initial ante-axis hypotheses, which expected only speculative hands to limp. The finding is consistent with the dead-money mechanism — when the pot is large enough, even premium hands gain more from multiway limped pots than from raising and folding the field. No separate mechanism has been assigned; it is treated as an extension of the dead-money pull into the premium-hand range.
Ch 2

Table Size

How adding opponents reshapes every position

UTG tightens monotonically as the table grows; BTN barely notices — and at 9-max it actually opens wider than at 6-max.

Measurement conditions: 2-blind, no ante, 100bb effective, rake 3%/3cap. Table size sweeps rows.

UTG contracts with every player added

The model sees table size as a continuous conditioning input from 2 to 10 players. We swept six sizes — HU (2), 3-max, 4-max, 6-max, 8-max, and 9-max — and measured VPIP by position at each.

VPIP by position and table size. 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · rake=3%/3cap · table size sweeps rows

Size BTN CO HJ MP / MP1 UTG
2-max (HU){{num:ch02.vpip.hu.btn}}
3-max{{num:ch02.vpip.3max.btn}}
4-max{{num:ch02.vpip.4max.btn}}{{num:ch02.vpip.4max.utg}}
6-max{{num:ch02.vpip.6max.btn}}{{num:ch02.vpip.6max.co}}{{num:ch02.vpip.6max.mp}}{{num:ch02.vpip.6max.utg}}
8-max{{num:ch02.vpip.8max.btn}}{{num:ch02.vpip.8max.co}}{{num:ch02.vpip.8max.hj}}{{num:ch02.vpip.8max.mp}}{{num:ch02.vpip.8max.utg}}
9-max{{num:ch02.vpip.9max.btn}}{{num:ch02.vpip.9max.co}}{{num:ch02.vpip.9max.hj}}14.3–14.5%{{num:ch02.vpip.9max.utg}}

Source: ch02-table-size.md §1 VPIP by position and table size

UTG VPIP from 4-max through 9-max — monotonically tighter with every player added.

UTG VPIP: 28.4% (4-max) → 17.2% (6-max) → 12.1% (8-max) → 11.0% (9-max). Each additional player behind UTG further tightens its profitable range.

Source: ch02-table-size.md §1 VPIP by position and table size

The pattern is clean: {{num:ch02.vpip.4max.utg}} at 4-max, {{num:ch02.vpip.6max.utg}} at 6-max, {{num:ch02.vpip.8max.utg}} at 8-max, {{num:ch02.vpip.9max.utg}} at 9-max. Each step adds opponents behind UTG and tightens the set of hands that can profitably survive 3-bet pressure from that many players.

Based on general poker theory Minimum defense frequency (MDF) against N opponents. UTG at a 9-max table must survive six players acting behind it — the probability that at least one holds a premium hand increases with every seat added. UTG's profitable range contracts to accommodate this mounting 3-bet threat. Falsifier: if UTG tightening were a memorized chart rather than an N-dependent EV calculation, the contraction would show discrete jumps at common table sizes (6, 9) rather than the smooth monotonic decline the data shows.
The rule of thumb If you move from 6-max to 9-max, cut your UTG range by roughly a third — from about 17% down to 11%. That is top pairs, premium broadways, and very little else. The extra three seats behind you make everything else unprofitable.

BTN is range-bound — and at 9-max it is widest

Look at the BTN column in the VPIP table above. Once you are past HU and 3-max (which are their own regimes, covered below), BTN barely moves: {{num:ch02.vpip.4max.btn}} at 4-max, {{num:ch02.vpip.6max.btn}} at 6-max, {{num:ch02.vpip.8max.btn}} at 8-max, {{num:ch02.vpip.9max.btn}} at 9-max. The range is 43–50% across four different table sizes.

The reason is structural. BTN always faces the same two opponents — SB and BB — regardless of how many players sit at the table. Adding a seventh, eighth, or ninth player behind UTG does nothing to change who BTN has to get through. BTN's fold equity target is constant.

What does change is the information BTN receives before acting. At 6-max, three players fold before BTN. At 9-max, seven fold. Those extra folds carry a signal: the remaining SB and BB are drawn from a population where seven players already declined to play. Their expected ranges weaken slightly with every prior fold. BTN can exploit this by opening wider — which is exactly what the solver does.

Nine-max BTN at {{num:ch02.vpip.9max.btn}} is wider than 6-max BTN at {{num:ch02.vpip.6max.btn}}. That runs counter to the intuition that a bigger table means tighter play for everyone. It is true for UTG. It is not true for BTN.

The rule of thumb Do not tighten your BTN range when you sit down at a full ring table. If anything, loosen it by a few percentage points. The extra folds in front of you are free information that the blinds are unlikely to hold premiums.

Heads-up: a different game entirely

HU BTN/SB plays {{num:ch02.vpip.hu.btn}} of hands. That is the positional gradient taken to its extreme — BTN faces exactly one opponent, the pot odds on a single-blind steal are enormous, and there are no other players to worry about. HU strategy diverges from full-ring in so many dimensions that it warrants its own treatment; the remaining sections focus on multi-player tables (3-max through 9-max) where the table-size gradient is the finding.

Raise sizing collapses at larger tables

The sizing story is as dramatic as the VPIP story — and moves in the opposite direction from what many players expect.

BTN and CO average raise size by table size. 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · table size sweeps rows

Size BTN avg raise CO avg raise
HU (2-max)2.0bb
3-max2.2bb
4-max3.3bb
6-max4.8bb3.3bb
8-max2.4bb2.8bb
9-max2.2bb2.2bb

Source: ch02-table-size.md §1 Raise sizes shrink dramatically at larger tables

BTN average raise size by table size — peaks at 6-max, collapses to min-raise at 9-max.

BTN avg raise: HU 2.0bb, 3-max 2.2bb, 4-max 3.3bb, 6-max 4.8bb (peak), 8-max 2.4bb, 9-max 2.2bb.

Source: ch02-table-size.md §1 Raise sizes shrink dramatically at larger tables

At 6-max, BTN opens to 4.8bb — a large sizing by modern standards. At 9-max, BTN opens to 2.2bb — a min-raise. CO follows the same pattern: 3.3bb at 6-max, 2.2bb at 9-max. At 6-max, BTN concentrates 88% of its raise mass at the 4.8bb sizing. At 9-max, the standard is a min-raise across all positions.

Based on general poker theory Prior-fold information filtering. At 9-max, BTN acts after seven players have folded. Those folds signal that no one held a premium, weakening the expected ranges of SB and BB. A min-raise achieves the same fold equity that a 4.8bb raise needed at 6-max, because the defending ranges are already narrowed by prior-fold conditioning. Falsifier: if the min-raise convention were a learned table-size chart artifact rather than a fold-equity response, it would appear as a discrete jump at 9-max rather than the monotonic decline from 4.8bb (6-max) through 2.4bb (8-max) to 2.2bb (9-max).
The rule of thumb At a full ring table, min-raise from every position. Do not apply 6-max conventions — a 4–5bb open at 9-max is over-sizing for the fold equity you actually need.

BB defense narrows with table size

BB defense vs table size. 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · table size sweeps rows

Size Opener Def% Fold% Call% Raise%
2-max (HU)BTN75.0%25.0%47.4%27.6%
4-maxBTN59.3%40.7%42.6%16.7%
6-maxCO51.8%48.2%39.2%12.6%
8-maxCO51.5%48.5%35.5%16.0%
9-maxCO50.2%49.8%38.6%11.5%

Source: ch02-table-size.md §2 BB defense by table size

BB defense rate from HU to 9-max — converges near 50% once the table reaches 6 players.

BB defense: HU 75.0%, 4-max 59.3%, 6-max 51.8%, 8-max 51.5%, 9-max 50.2%. Convergence near 50% at 6-max and above.

Source: ch02-table-size.md §2 BB defense by table size

BB defense drops from 75.0% at HU to 50.2% at 9-max. The big drop happens between HU and 6-max; after that, defense flattens around 50–52%.

Based on general poker theory At larger tables, BB faces an opener who survived more positions. A CO open at 9-max has passed through seven players — it is a stronger range than a CO open at 6-max that passed through three. BB's calling range must contract to maintain profitable defense against a stronger opening range.

Once the table reaches six players, the opener's surviving-range quality starts to level off. The difference between a CO open that survived four folds (6-max) and one that survived six folds (9-max) is smaller than the difference between a BTN open that survived zero folds (HU) and a CO open that survived three (6-max). That is why BB defense converges at 50–52% from 6-max onward.

The rule of thumb At HU, defend three quarters of hands from BB. At a full ring table, defend about half. The threshold converges quickly — once you are at 6-max, the adjustment for adding more players is tiny.

C-bet peaks at 8-max, then drops

This was the finding we did not predict.

CO c-bet frequency on K72r by table size. 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · CO vs BB SRP · K72r · table size sweeps rows

Size Opener C-bet% Avg bet
2-max (HU)BTN69.1%2.1bb
3-maxBTN69.7%2.2bb
4-maxBTN82.5%2.3bb
6-maxCO83.6%2.4bb
8-maxCO91.7%2.4bb
9-maxCO81.1%2.3bb

Source: ch02-table-size.md §3 Flop c-bet by table size and board texture — K72r

The progression from 3-max through 8-max looks like a clean trend: 69.7% → 82.5% → 83.6% → 91.7%. Bigger tables, stronger opener ranges, more c-betting on dry boards. The "stronger range ⇒ higher c-bet" story fits.

Then 9-max drops to 81.1% — below 6-max. Adding one player to an 8-max table costs 10.6 percentage points of c-bet frequency on K72r. This reversal is not fully explained by the "stronger range advantage" narrative. At 9-max, CO has survived more folds and presumably has a stronger range. Yet c-bet drops.

One possible contributing factor from the source: at 9-max, cold callers are more common, so more hands enter the flop multiway. C-betting into potential multiway pots on K72r is less automatic than into a heads-up pot. But the source explicitly notes this is an empirical finding without a complete theoretical explanation.

The rule of thumb Do not assume that bigger tables always mean more c-betting. The data shows a non-monotonic peak at 8-max. At 9-max, pull back your dry-board c-bet frequency slightly compared to what you would do at 6 or 8 players.

HU c-bet: lower than you would expect

At HU, BTN c-bets K72r only 69.1% — well below the 83.6% at 6-max. This is counterintuitive. BTN has position and the board favors high cards. Why is the c-bet lower?

The answer is range width. BTN played 84.6% of hands preflop. BB also played close to 100% of hands (defending near-universally at HU). On K72r, BB holds top pair or better at roughly the population frequency — the selective "only strong hands call" filter is absent. The opener's range advantage on K72r is real but diluted when both players entered with everything.

HU multi-board c-bet comparison. HU BTN vs BB · ante=0 · 100bb effective · note: position conventions differ at HU

Board HU BTN c-bet% HU avg bet 6-max CO c-bet%
K72r69.1%2.1bb83.6%
A94r59.4%2.0bb64.9%
T9866.2%2.0bb59.5%
K94ss23.2%1.9bb32.2%

Source: ch02-table-size.md §3 Multi-board HU c-bet (Batch 02d data)

A notable pattern: at HU, T98 c-bet (66.2%) is nearly as high as K72r (69.1%). The dry/wet ordering reverses compared to 6-max. When both players have near-universal ranges, a connected wet board is not structurally worse for the opener — both players have equity everywhere. The monotone board (K94ss) remains the lowest at both formats.

The rule of thumb At HU, apply a more selective c-bet strategy even on nominally dry boards. Your opponent hit K-high more often than you would expect from a 6-max population. And do not assume dry boards are dramatically better for c-betting than wet boards at HU — the gap narrows when ranges are universal.

The 3-max anomaly: smaller table, tighter BTN

Three-max BTN opens 43.6% — tighter than 4-max BTN at 45.9%. This is the only point in the table-size sweep where a smaller table produces a tighter result at BTN.

The resolution is in BB's 3-bet frequency.

Size BB def% BB call% BB raise%
3-max59.5%34.6%24.9%
4-max59.3%42.6%16.7%

Source: ch02-table-size.md §4 3-max vs 4-max BTN anomaly — BB defense comparison

At 3-max, BB 3-bets 24.9% — eight percentage points higher than at 4-max. The reason is information. At 3-max, BTN is the first voluntary actor — there are no prior folds. BB faces a BTN whose range has not been filtered by anyone declining to play. BB recognizes the opening range is at its widest possible and responds by 3-betting aggressively to punish it.

At 4-max, UTG has already folded before BTN acts. This fold mildly signals that UTG did not hold a premium, which weakly narrows the expected strength of the field. BTN exploits this by opening wider and sizing larger (3.3bb at 4-max vs 2.2bb at 3-max). BB, facing a BTN that has some informational advantage, 3-bets less often.

The practical takeaway is that "shorter table = looser play" does not hold for BTN when the table structure removes prior-fold information entirely. At 3-max, BTN is effectively the first player to speak — and it pays the price in BB's 3-bet aggression.

The rule of thumb At a 3-player table, do not expect the button to play loose. BB will 3-bet you about 25% of the time — roughly one in four opens. If you cannot handle that 3-bet frequency with your hand, fold it preflop.

The key adjustments at a glance

Summary of key metrics across table sizes. 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · rake=3%/3cap

Dimension 4-max 6-max (baseline) 8-max 9-max
UTG VPIP28.4%17.2%12.1%11.0%
BTN VPIP45.9%43.3%44.2%49.8%
BTN avg raise3.3bb4.8bb2.4bb2.2bb
BB defense59.3%51.8%51.5%50.2%
CO c-bet K72r83.6%91.7%81.1%

Source: ch02-table-size.md §§1–3

What we didn't test in Ch 2

  • Table sizes 5, 7, and 10 were not swept. Five-max and seven-max are uncommon live formats. Ten-max is supported by the training infrastructure (the model handles 2–10 players) but was not queried; extrapolation from the 9-max data point is not validated.
  • Positions other than UTG and BTN have sparse data at 4-max and 3-max. The 4-max sweep reports UTG and BTN; CO does not exist as a distinct position at that size. 3-max reports BTN and BB only.
  • Multiway pot dynamics were not measured. The c-bet data is CO vs BB single-raised pots. If a 9-max orbit produces more multiway pots, the c-bet dynamics in those pots are unmeasured.
  • 3-bet pot c-bet by table size was not tested. All c-bet data in this chapter is single-raised pots. Whether the 8-max c-bet peak holds in 3-bet pots is unknown.
  • The HU c-bet data covers four boards only. K72r, A94r, T98, and K94ss. Other textures (paired, connected low, etc.) at HU are not in the sweep.

Five practical adjustments

  1. Tighten UTG by roughly 3 percentage points per player added beyond a 4-max table. At 9-max, UTG opens only 11% — top pairs, premium broadways, and almost nothing else. If you carry your 6-max UTG range to a full ring table, you are opening about 50% wider than the solver.
  2. Keep BTN range near 43–50% regardless of table size (≥4-max). The fold equity target against SB and BB is constant. At 9-max, you can even widen slightly — the extra prior folds weaken the remaining blinds' expected ranges.
  3. Min-raise from all positions at 8-max and 9-max. The solver drops BTN from 4.8bb (6-max) to 2.2bb (9-max). Prior-fold information makes large sizing unnecessary. If you are still opening to 4–5bb at a full ring table, you are over-sizing.
  4. Defend roughly 50% from BB at tables of 6 or more. BB defense converges quickly once the table reaches 6-max. At HU, defend 75%. Between those extremes, the adjustment tracks the opener's range quality, which depends on how many players that opener survived.
  5. Do not extrapolate the c-bet trend past 8-max. The data shows a non-monotonic peak: 8-max CO c-bets K72r at 91.7%, but 9-max drops to 81.1%. Adding one player beyond 8-max reverses the trend. Use 81% — not 92% — as your dry-board c-bet anchor at a full ring table.

Research notes

Details for readers interested in the methodology behind the findings above. Skip this section if you just want the practical takeaways.

  • The 3-max BTN anomaly (M-5, TS-4 in source). The finding that 3-max BTN (43.6%) is tighter than 4-max BTN (45.9%) was resolved via BB 3-bet frequency data (24.9% vs 16.7%). The direction is counterintuitive — a smaller table producing a tighter position — and the source notes it may warrant further investigation. Per-combo investigation confirmed the 4-max BTN sizing distribution is concentrated (85.8% of raise mass at 3.5bb, 13.3% at 2.2bb) and that the 7.2bb sizing noted in probe hands like KTs represents less than 3% of opening combos by reach. The aggregate average of 3.3bb matches the published number. Do not generalize "4-max BTN opens to 7.2bb" from a single-hand probe.
  • The c-bet peak at 8-max was not predicted. The pre-campaign hypothesis was that c-bet frequency on dry boards would rise monotonically with table size (stronger opener ranges → more c-betting). The 8-max peak and 9-max reversal were empirical findings. The source proposes a cold-caller-frequency explanation (multiway dynamics at 9-max) but notes the reversal lacks a complete theoretical explanation. The finding is catalogued under M-4 (MDF compression) scope in the mechanism registry, with the c-bet non-monotonicity flagged as an additive observation that extends beyond the original mechanism's prediction.
  • HU c-bet data (Batch 02d) tested four boards. K72r, A94r, T98, and K94ss were the test set. The dry/wet ordering reversal at HU (T98 c-bet 66.2% ≈ K72r c-bet 69.1%) is observed on this test set; whether the pattern holds on boards outside this set (e.g., paired boards, connected low boards) is untested. Source data for tables 3–9 uses CO vs BB single-raised pots; HU data uses BTN vs BB (the only possible configuration at HU). Position conventions differ — see GAME-RULES.md §Axis 3 for action-order effect at HU.
  • All findings are single-checkpoint (per methodology §Step 5). Cross-checkpoint stability has not been confirmed by the training team. Structural and directional claims are expected to be stable; specific per-cell magnitudes may drift. Cite patterns, not exact numbers, when applying these findings outside the reported context.
Ch 3

Stack Depth

How deeper stacks reshape every street

Stack depth is the quietest format lever. Ante adds dead money. A straddle rearranges the action order. Larger tables pack in more opponents. Those changes are obvious the moment you sit down. Stack depth, by contrast, looks like the same game with bigger numbers — until you realize the solver plays it completely differently at every street.

This chapter sweeps effective stacks from 20bb to 600bb and tracks what changes. The short version: shallow stacks compress every decision into shove-or-fold; deep stacks expand postflop options so dramatically that river overbets become the default action — and the threshold where overbets "unlock" is sharper than you would expect.

Measurement conditions: 6-max, 2-blind, no ante, rake 3%/3cap. Stack depth sweeps rows.

3.1 Preflop opens by depth

BTN widens steadily as stacks get deeper. UTG and MP barely move.

Preflop VPIP by position and effective stack depth. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · rake=3%/3cap · stack depth sweeps rows

DepthUTGMPCOBTN
20 bb15.6%22.4%24.4%30.6%
50 bb17.8%23.9%27.6%39.4%
100 bb17.2%22.9%28.1%43.3%
200 bb17.5%23.1%29.5%46.9%
400 bb17.7%22.7%29.5%48.9%
600 bb17.6%22.0%28.7%49.2%

Source: ch03-depth.md §1 — batches_ch03_opens_by_depth

BTN widens +18.6pp from 20bb to 600bb. UTG and MP stay within a ±2pp band across the entire sweep from 100bb to 600bb. CO shows a modest +4pp widening but flattens above 200bb.

BTN VPIP across six stack depths. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · rake=3%/3cap

BTN VPIP: 30.6% (20bb), 39.4% (50bb), 43.3% (100bb), 46.9% (200bb), 48.9% (400bb), 49.2% (600bb).

Source: ch03-depth.md §1 — batches_ch03_opens_by_depth

Why does BTN widen so much more than the other positions?

Based on general poker theory Implied odds. Deeper stacks make speculative hands — suited connectors, small pairs — more valuable because you can win your opponent's entire stack when you hit. BTN is the position best placed to realize those implied odds (last to act, can control pot size), which is why the widening concentrates there rather than at UTG. Falsifier: if the widening were a blanket "more chips = looser" effect, UTG would widen at a similar rate — it does not (±2pp across 100–600bb).

The 20bb entry deserves its own discussion — see §3.6 below. At 20bb, BTN contracts to 30.6% because many hands cannot profitably call a 3-bet at that stack depth. The open-raise effectively functions as a commitment vehicle, not an information-gathering action.

The rule of thumb If you are moving from a 100bb game to a deep-stack game (200bb+), widen your BTN open by roughly 4–6pp. Add small pairs, suited connectors, and suited aces that you would fold at 100bb. UTG and MP ranges stay the same — the extra depth does not help early-position hands that cannot realize implied odds from out of position.

3.2 BB defense shifts with depth

The way BB defends changes character as stacks get deeper: at 20bb, nearly all defense is raises (shoves). At 600bb, nearly all defense is calls.

BB defense breakdown vs CO 2.5bb open, by effective stack depth. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · stack depth sweeps rows

DepthDef%Fold%Call%Raise%
20 bb32.6%67.4%8.7%23.9%
50 bb49.6%50.4%34.7%14.9%
100 bb51.8%48.2%39.2%12.6%
200 bb52.2%47.8%37.3%14.9%
400 bb52.8%47.2%40.8%11.9%
600 bb52.1%47.9%43.4%8.6%

Source: ch03-depth.md §2 — batches_ch03_defense_by_depth

Three patterns stand out.

20bb is a different game. Defense collapses to 32.6%. BB folds 67.4% of the time and raises (mostly shoves) 23.9%. Flat-calling barely exists — 8.7%. The postflop SPR after a call would be so thin that calling and then folding to a c-bet wastes chips. The solver treats 20bb as shove-or-fold territory.

The 200bb dip in call%. Call% is not monotonic — it drops to 37.3% at 200bb (below the 100bb baseline of 39.2%) before recovering at 400bb (40.8%) and climbing to 43.4% at 600bb. At 200bb, the high SPR creates room for opponents to barrel repeatedly and re-raise the turn, which makes marginal flat-calls from 100bb unsuitable. At 400bb+, implied odds become dominant and wide calls return.

Raise% trends toward zero at deep stacks. At 600bb, raise% drops to 8.6%. 3-betting at 600bb forces an enormous pot with high commitment risk. The solver prefers calling to preserve postflop flexibility.

Based on general poker theory Pot geometry at different SPRs. At 20bb, calling and seeing a flop creates a commitment tree where nearly every continuation forces all-in action. The solver's binary response (shove or fold) is correct because the intermediate option (call and navigate postflop) barely exists. At 600bb, the opposite holds: calling preserves massive postflop room and implied odds dominate. Falsifier: if the 20bb regime were just "tight play," raise% would be low as well. Instead it peaks at 23.9% — confirming the shove-or-fold structure.
The rule of thumb At 200bb+, expect more flat-calling from BB and less 3-betting. Your c-bet strategy needs to account for a wider (but more passive) defending range that reaches the flop through calls, not raises. At 20bb, expect BB to either fold or shove — plan your open-raise with that binary response in mind.

3.3 C-bet frequency drops with depth

This is the most consistent pattern in the chapter. On every board texture, CO c-bets less often as stacks get deeper. The magnitude depends on the board.

CO c-bet frequency across four board textures and six stack depths, single-raised pot. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · CO vs BB SRP · stack depth sweeps rows

DepthK72r (dry K-high)A94r (dry A-high)T98 (connected wet)K94ss (monotone)
20 bb84.4%98.4%65.0%45.9%
50 bb89.6%83.7%62.0%40.6%
100 bb83.6%64.9%59.5%32.2%
200 bb75.7%58.2%55.1%26.2%
400 bb70.0%58.7%49.9%23.6%
600 bb68.3%61.5%46.4%22.9%

Source: ch03-depth.md §3 — batches_ch03_cbet_by_depth

CO c-bet frequency by board texture across stack depths. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · CO vs BB SRP

K72r: 84.4%→89.6%→83.6%→75.7%→70.0%→68.3%. T98: 65.0%→62.0%→59.5%→55.1%→49.9%→46.4%. K94ss: 45.9%→40.6%→32.2%→26.2%→23.6%→22.9%.

Source: ch03-depth.md §3 — batches_ch03_cbet_by_depth

K72r (dry K-high): drops −15.3pp from 100bb to 600bb. At 50bb it actually peaks at 89.6% — the near-commitment dynamic at shallow stacks pushes frequency upward before the standard SPR attenuation takes over.

A94r (dry A-high): the dramatic outlier at 20bb. The solver c-bets 98.4% of the time at 20bb — near-mandatory. At that stack depth, calling preflop on an ace-high board has essentially committed BB's stack. The solver recognizes this and fires almost always. From 100bb onward, frequency stabilizes in the 58–65% range.

T98 (connected wet): the most predictable curve. Monotonic from 65.0% down to 46.4%. Wet connected boards are dangerous at deep stacks because opponents hold more drawing equity, and deeper SPR lets those draws realize their equity over multiple streets.

K94ss (monotone): uniformly low (22–46%) and declining. On a monotone board, every caller has a credible flush draw. The opener's c-bet gains less fold equity at any depth, and the problem compounds as stacks get deeper.

C-bet sizing grows only marginally with depth — on K72r, average bet moves from 1.8bb at 20bb to 2.6bb at 600bb. The action is in frequency, not sizing.

Based on general poker theory SPR and fold equity. At high SPR, a c-bet commits a tiny fraction of the remaining stack. The opponent can call with a wider range knowing there is plenty of room to maneuver on later streets. The opener must c-bet a more polarized range to justify the bet — marginal hands shift to check-back because they can win at showdown without building the pot. Falsifier: if the c-bet drop were a blanket "deep = cautious" rule rather than SPR-specific, the drop magnitude would be the same across board textures. It is not — K72r drops 15.3pp, K94ss drops only 9.3pp (from an already low baseline).
The rule of thumb At 200bb+, adopt a more selective c-bet strategy on dry boards. Check back medium-strength hands — second pair, top pair with a weak kicker — and develop a check-back / delayed bet line. Reserve c-bets for strong equity hands and bluffs that need fold equity. At 600bb on K72r, expect to c-bet roughly 68%, not the 84% you are used to at 100bb.

3.4 3-bet pots: frequency is flat, but texture flips the depth direction

In single-raised pots, c-bet frequency drops with depth on every board (§3.3). In 3-bet pots, the story is more complicated — and on some boards, it reverses entirely.

The K72r baseline: 100% at every depth

CO opens 2.5bb, BTN 3-bets to 8bb, CO calls. Flop Kd7s2h. CO checks (OOP), BTN to act.

BTN c-bet frequency and sizing in a 3-bet pot on K72r. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · CO vs BTN 3BP · K72r · stack depth sweeps rows

DepthBet%Avg bet
100 bb100%6.1bb
300 bb100%7.5bb
600 bb100%7.0bb

Source: ch03-depth.md §4 — batches_ch03_3bp_cbet_by_depth

Frequency is saturated at 100% regardless of depth. On K72r, BTN's 3-betting range has such a strong range advantage that checking is never correct at any SPR. The variation shows up only in sizing: 6.1bb at 100bb, rising to 7.5bb at 300bb, then settling at 7.0bb at 600bb.

This makes K72r the wrong board to study 3BP depth dynamics. It is an extreme case.

The texture reversal: A94r grows, T98 shrinks

The full texture sweep tells a different story.

BTN c-bet frequency in 3-bet pots across four boards and six stack depths. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · CO vs BTN 3BP · board named per row · stack depth sweeps columns

Board20bb50bb100bb200bb400bb600bbDirection
K72r100%100%100%100%100%100%Saturated
A94r4.5%27.5%48.0%55.9%79.3%87.1%Grows with depth
K94ss31.3%53.4%57.5%77.6%90.4%90.9%Grows with depth
T9874.8%54.1%20.1%9.7%6.8%5.1%Shrinks sharply

Source: ch03-depth.md §4b — batches_ft_phase3_3bp_textures

The direction reverses between boards. On A94r and K94ss, the 3-bettor c-bets more as stacks get deeper — from 4.5% at 20bb all the way to 87.1% at 600bb on A94r. On T98, the solver goes from 74.8% at 20bb down to 5.1% at 600bb. That is a near-complete reversal of the single-raised-pot pattern, where all boards dropped with depth.

Pre-condition: On dry A-high and monotone boards, BTN's 3-bet range is polarized toward value (big pairs, nut draws). Deeper stacks let BTN commit with that value over multiple streets — c-bet frequency grows because the range can sustain the deep-stack play.

Post-condition: On connected wet boards (T98), the caller's range smashes the flop. At shallow stacks, geometric commitment forces BTN to fire even with a range disadvantage. At deep stacks, BTN defers to check-back — the caller's equity realization improves with SPR.

Why it splits: the caller's flop equity relative to the 3-bettor's range. On A94r, the caller rarely connects. On T98, the caller connects hard.

This finding was verified across three different position pairs (CO-BTN, UTG-CO, MP-BTN). The direction is perfectly position-invariant — the same texture-split pattern appears regardless of who opens and who 3-bets.

The rule of thumb Do not generalize K72r's "always c-bet in a 3BP" rule to all boards. At 600bb in a 3-bet pot, c-bet A94r and K94ss aggressively (85–90%). On T98, check almost always (5%). The depth direction in 3-bet pots depends entirely on whether the caller's range connects with the flop.

3.5 The river overbet unlock

This is the chapter's headline finding. At deep stacks, river average bet size does not grow gradually — it jumps.

The step function on K72r3d7c

CO opens, BB calls, flop c-bet/call, turn bet/call, river BB checks, CO to act. Runout: Kd7s2h3d7c.

Multi-street sizing and frequency across stack depths, CO vs BB on K72r3d7c. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · CO vs BB · K72r→3d→7c · stack depth sweeps rows

DepthFlop cbet%Flop avgTurn barrel%Turn avgRiver bet%River avg
100 bb83.6%2.4bb60.5%11.4bb60.3%25.5bb
200 bb75.7%2.5bb55.8%11.6bb63.4%24.2bb
300 bb72.0%2.5bb55.7%11.7bb69.0%24.8bb
400 bb70.0%2.5bb55.7%11.7bb74.4%29.8bb
600 bb68.3%2.6bb55.8%11.7bb82.2%54.4bb

Source: ch03-depth.md §5 — batches_ch03_river_by_depth + batch v11e (500bb river-only)

River average bet size across stack depths on K72r3d7c. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · CO vs BB

River avg bet: 25.5bb (100bb), 24.2bb (200bb), 24.8bb (300bb), 29.8bb (400bb), 38.7bb (500bb), 54.4bb (600bb).

Source: ch03-depth.md §5 — batches_ch03_river_by_depth + batch v11e (500bb river-only)

Two distinct phases.

Phase 1 (100–400bb): frequency rises, size stays near 25bb. River bet% climbs from 60.3% to 74.4% while average bet stays in the 24–30bb range (roughly pot-sized). More of the range polarizes — medium-strength hands increasingly prefer to check as SPR grows, which concentrates the betting range in strong value and bluffs.

Phase 2 (400bb onset → 600bb): the size jump. Average bet is 29.8bb at 400bb, jumps to 38.7bb at 500bb (river-only batch), and reaches 54.4bb at 600bb. The overbet "unlock" begins in the 400–500bb window — not as a gradual curve but as a step. Below 400bb, bet sizing is constrained to pot-sized territory. Above 400bb, sizing breaks free into 2× pot territory.

Turn barrel frequency is essentially flat at 55–56% from 200bb onward. The strategic variation concentrates on the river.

What drives the step: all-in scaling, not new hands betting bigger

Per-combo data clarifies the mechanism. The average bet rise at 600bb is not driven by medium-value hands switching to overbets. Premium hands (QQ, JJ, TT) shove all-in at every depth — but at 400bb they shove 387.5bb, and at 600bb they shove 587.5bb. The larger all-in size pulls the average up mechanically.

Medium-value hands (77) actually bet smaller at 600bb than at 400bb. The "overbet unlock" is an all-in-scaling phenomenon: premiums always commit; the commit size grows with the stack.

Cross-runout comparison

The K72r step function is not the universal pattern. Four runouts spanning different texture classes show different characters:

River average bet size at each depth across four runouts. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · CO vs BB · stack depth sweeps rows

DepthK72r3d7cA94rJs2dT98Jc2dK94ss2c7h
100bb25.5bb37.8bb49.8bb61.5bb
200bb24.2bb43.8bb55.6bb118.9bb
300bb24.8bb52.0bb64.5bb177.4bb
400bb29.8bb74.7bb70.2bb236.6bb
500bb38.7bb101.8bb84.8bb299.0bb
600bb54.4bb137.3bb104.8bb363.7bb

Source: ch03-depth.md §5b — batches_v11_river_step (K72r), batches_ft_phase2_second_runout (A94r), batches_ft_phase6_more_runouts (T98, K94ss)

The step function is K72r-specific. The other three runouts scale continuously (geometrically) with depth. But the direction is universal: bigger average bet at deeper stacks, on every tested runout.

The magnitude varies enormously. At 600bb, average bet ranges from 54.4bb (K72r dry) to 363.7bb (K94ss monotone) — a spread of nearly 7×. K94ss is the polarization extreme: the river betting range on a monotone K-high board is nearly flush-or-air, so shoves dominate the value range. At 600bb, average bet approaches stack size.

The rule of thumb At 400bb+ on dry-board runouts, expect and make 2× pot river bets. On monotone runouts at deep stacks, plan for shove-or-fold dynamics at the river — average bets approach the full stack. The key threshold to remember: below 400bb, river sizing stays pot-sized. Above 400bb, overbets start. At 600bb, they dominate.

3.6 Shallow stacks: the 20bb regime

At 20bb, the game compresses into a near-commitment structure. Every preflop decision is a decision about whether to put your stack in.

BTN tightens to 30.6%. At 100bb, BTN opens 43.3%. The 12.7pp contraction at 20bb reflects the commitment reality: many hands cannot profitably call a 3-bet when calling costs a third of the remaining stack. BTN opens only hands it would be comfortable committing with.

BB defense collapses. Only 32.6% defense, with 67.4% folds and 23.9% raises (near-shoves). Call% is 8.7% — almost no flat-calling. The solver treats the preflop decision as binary: fold or shove.

A94r c-bet spikes to 98.4%. On a dry ace-high board at 20bb, calling preflop has essentially committed both players. The solver responds by c-betting near-universally. This is the shallowest SPR regime where top-pair equivalent hands should never check back.

K72r at 20bb is slightly lower than at 50bb (84.4% vs 89.6%). This may reflect the near-commitment dynamic reducing mixed bet/check strategies — at 20bb, the solver either commits or does not, producing slightly different mixing than the 50bb sweet spot where c-betting is a real strategic choice.

The rule of thumb At 20bb effective, convert your BB defending range into a shove-or-fold decision tree. Hands you would call with at 100bb — suited connectors, small pairs — should either be shoved (if they have sufficient equity for an all-in) or folded (if they do not). Do not flat-call at 20bb effective. From BTN, tighten to roughly 31% — only hands willing to commit.

What we didn't test in Ch 3

  • Depths between 400bb and 600bb are sparsely tested. The 500bb data point (river-only) confirms the overbet step begins in the 400–500bb window, but flop and turn dynamics at 500bb were not separately queried. The exact threshold where the step function begins is bracketed, not pinpointed.
  • 50bb and 150bb are missing from some sweeps. The 50bb entry appears in the VPIP and c-bet tables but not in the full multi-street river analysis. The 150bb depth was not tested.
  • MP and CO postflop data at non-100bb depths is sparse. The c-bet tables use CO vs BB as the primary matchup. Applying these c-bet frequencies to other position pairs at non-standard depths requires caution.
  • River dynamics are tested on a limited set of runouts. The four-runout comparison (K72r → 3d → 7c, A94r → Js → 2d, T98 → Jc → 2d, K94ss → 2c → 7h) covers dry/wet/monotone categories, but specific runout effects within each category may vary. The step-function character on K72r is confirmed as runout-specific — other dry-board runouts may or may not show the same step.

Five practical adjustments

  1. At 20bb: no flat-calls from BB — shove or fold. The solver's 8.7% call rate at 20bb confirms that the intermediate option barely exists. If your hand is strong enough to continue, shove. If not, fold.
  2. At 200bb+: c-bet dry boards 10–15pp less than at 100bb. On K72r, frequency drops from 84% to 68% across 100bb to 600bb. Check back medium-strength hands and develop a delayed-bet line. Reserve c-bets for strong value and bluffs that need fold equity.
  3. At 400bb+: plan for river overbets. The step function begins in the 400–500bb window. Below 400bb, pot-sized river bets are standard. Above 400bb, 2× pot bets become the solver's preferred sizing with polarized ranges. Size up on the river when you have depth.
  4. In 3-bet pots, match your c-bet to the texture, not the depth. A94r and K94ss grow to 87–91% c-bet at 600bb; T98 shrinks to 5%. The depth direction in 3-bet pots depends on whether the caller's range connects with the flop, not on a blanket SPR rule.
  5. At 600bb: widen BTN opens by 4–6pp, but keep UTG/MP unchanged. The implied-odds widening is position-specific. BTN at 600bb opens 49.2% (vs 43.3% at 100bb). UTG and MP barely move.

Research notes

Details for readers interested in the methodology behind the findings above. Skip this section if you just want the practical adjustments.

  • 600bb training-distribution confidence. The 600bb datapoints are empirically observed from the trained model, but the exact stack_dist_values CUDA training configuration was confirmed by the training team (Scott Chen, 2026-04-14) as in-distribution. Deep-stack conclusions in this chapter carry full confidence. The overbet step function between 400bb and 600bb is a structural finding, not a training-tail artifact.
  • The overbet step-function threshold (M-7 scope). v1.0.0 of the research described this as a "400→600bb discontinuity." Batch v11e (500bb river-only) refined this to a 400→500bb onset with continued escalation to 600bb. The step character is confirmed K72r-specific — other tested runouts show continuous geometric scaling. Additionally, paired-board runouts (e.g., 663r) show no overbet unlock at all (100bb avg 27.4bb ≈ 600bb avg 27.7bb). The mechanism is texture-gated: it applies on non-paired textures, not universally. Internal mechanism reference: M-7, tier T1-WEAK (downgraded from T1 by the 663r falsification of direction-universality).
  • C-bet attenuation mechanism scope (M-6). The SPR-driven c-bet drop documented in §3.3 is confirmed across three boards (K72r, T98, K94ss) with strict monotonic decrease from 100bb onward (Pass H verified). The 50bb regime shows a different pattern on some boards (K72r peaks at 89.6% at 50bb) — this is attributed to the near-commitment dynamic at shallow stacks, not a violation of the mechanism. Internal mechanism reference: M-6, tier T1. The 3BP texture-reversal (§3.4) is a separate mechanism (M-18, tier T1), operating within 3-bet pots specifically — do not conflate SRP and 3BP c-bet depth dynamics.
Ch 4

Rake

Rake changes everything about how BB defends — and almost nothing about how anyone opens.

That asymmetry is the headline finding. Across a sweep from 0% to 5% rake, preflop open frequencies barely move. But BB's calling range shrinks dramatically, flop c-bet strategy diverges by board texture, and the river does something nobody predicted.

Measurement conditions: 6-max, 2-blind, no ante, 100bb effective. Rake rate sweeps columns. Note: 2%/2cap rows show anomalous behavior documented in Research notes.

4.1 Preflop opens are rake-insensitive

Open VPIP — the rate at which each position voluntarily enters the pot — barely reacts to rake.

Preflop open VPIP by position and rake level. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · rake sweeps columns

RakeUTGMPCOBTN
0%/0cap17.2%22.9%28.1%43.3%
3%/3cap17.2%22.9%28.1%43.3%
5%/5cap17.5%23.6%29.4%43.3%

Source: ch04-rake.md §1 Preflop opens × rake

The largest movement is CO at 5% rake — 6-max context aside, the shift is only +1.3pp. UTG moves +0.3pp. BTN doesn't move at all.

Why? Rake is charged when a flop is dealt (the no-flop-no-drop rule). When you open-raise from CO and everyone folds, no flop happens and no rake is taken. The open-raiser's EV calculation doesn't include rake — rake only enters the picture after BB decides to call and a flop is dealt.

Based on general poker theory No-flop-no-drop mechanics. Rake is applied to the pot only when a flop is dealt. Since the opener's decision to raise precedes any flop, rake doesn't change the EV of the open itself — it changes the EV of the call against the open. Falsifier: if rake also applied to pots won preflop (a "time-charge" model), we'd expect VPIP to compress at high rake. It doesn't.

What this means in practice: When you transition to a higher-rake game, don't change your opening ranges. The adjustment belongs to the defenders, not the openers.

4.2 BB defense drops sharply at 5% rake

While opens stay flat, BB's response changes dramatically.

BB defense breakdown vs CO 2.5bb open, by rake level. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · rake sweeps columns

RakeDef%Fold%Call%3-bet%
0%/0cap51.8%48.2%39.2%12.6%
3%/3cap51.8%48.2%39.2%12.6%
5%/5cap43.9%56.1%29.0%15.0%

Source: ch04-rake.md §2 BB defense × rake

At 5% rake, BB's overall defense drops from 51.8% to 43.9% — a 7.9pp decline. The components tell the story of how that defense contracts:

The 0% and 3% rows are identical. This is expected — the 3%/3cap configuration is the Cash 1.1.0 baseline, and the 0% query uses the same trained model at its default parameter. See §4.6 for the technical explanation.

Based on general poker theory No-flop-no-drop call-suppression. Rake is charged on the flop. Calling preflop and seeing a flop immediately incurs rake on any pot won. Hands whose EV is near zero at 0% rake become negative at 5% because rake eats the thin margin. The 3-bet avoids the flop entirely — if CO folds, no rake is taken. Falsifier: if rake were charged on preflop pots too, 3-bet% would also drop (not rise), because the 3-bet itself would be taxed.

BB defense components at three rake levels — fold%, call%, and 3-bet%. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · CO vs BB · rake sweeps groups

Chart data matches the BB defense table above: at 5% rake, call% falls 10.2pp while 3-bet% rises 2.4pp.

Source: ch04-rake.md §2 BB defense × rake

What this means in practice: At 5% rake, tighten your BB flatting range by roughly 10pp. Hands at the margin — suited gappers, weak suited aces, dominated broadways — should shift to either fold or 3-bet. The 3-bet is a rake-avoidance play: resolve preflop, skip the rake.

4.3 C-bet frequency diverges by board texture

Rake doesn't suppress c-bets uniformly. On dry boards it pushes frequency down. On a connected wet board, it pushes frequency up.

CO c-bet frequency across four flop textures, by rake level. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · CO vs BB SRP · rake sweeps columns

RakeK72rA94rT98K94ss
0%/0cap83.6%64.9%59.5%32.2%
3%/3cap83.6%64.9%59.5%32.2%
5%/5cap77.1%57.5%65.1%28.4%

Source: ch04-rake.md §3 Flop c-bet × rake

On the dry boards:

These follow the intuitive logic. Thin value bets — hands where the c-bet EV is near zero — become losers at 5% rake. The opener checks back more with marginal holdings and keeps a cleaner, value-heavy c-bet range.

Then there is T98. It rises 5.6pp (59.5% → 65.1%). The direction reverses.

Based on general poker theory Rake-driven range purification. On a connected wet board like T98, BB calls with a wide range at 0% rake — draws, pairs, combo-draws. At 5% rake, some of those calls become unprofitable. BB folds more often. With BB folding more, CO's c-bet achieves higher fold equity. The solver responds by shifting from a mixed strategy (bet some, check some) to a purer value strategy that bets more often, not less. Falsifier: if the c-bet rise were noise, we'd expect random direction across boards. Instead the direction splits cleanly: dry boards down, wet board up — matching the "fold-equity improvement" prediction.

C-bet frequency by board texture at three rake levels. T98 diverges — rising at 5% rake while dry boards drop. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · CO vs BB SRP · rake sweeps groups

Chart data matches the c-bet table above: at 5% rake, K72r drops 6.5pp and A94r drops 7.4pp, while T98 rises 5.6pp.

Source: ch04-rake.md §3 Flop c-bet × rake

What this means in practice: At 5% rake on dry boards, check back more marginal c-bets — second pair, weak top pair. On connected wet boards, c-bet more frequently. Your opponent is folding at a higher rate on those boards because of rake pressure, so your thin bets become profitable, not unprofitable. This is counterintuitive: high rake makes you more aggressive on wet boards, not less.

4.4 The river does the opposite of what you would expect

Before we ran the data, the prediction was straightforward: higher rake → less river betting. Thin value becomes unprofitable, so the solver should check more on the river.

The data disagreed.

River betting on K72r3d7c, CO to act, by rake level. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · CO vs BB SRP · K72r → 3d → 7c · rake sweeps rows

RakeRiver bet%Avg bet
0%/0cap60.3%25.5bb
3%/3cap60.3%25.5bb
5%/5cap91.3%21.1bb

Source: ch04-rake.md §4 River thin-value × rake

At 5% rake, river bet frequency jumps from 60.3% to 91.3% — a 31pp increase. Average bet size drops from 25.5bb to 21.1bb. The solver bets more often but smaller.

This was flagged as a wrong-direction prediction during the research. The initial hypothesis was "thin river value bets should drop with rake." The data shows the opposite. Two effects appear to operate simultaneously:

Based on general poker theory Call-suppression polarization (leading hypothesis, not confirmed per-hand). By the river, rake has already been paid on earlier streets. BB's calling range at the river is narrower — BB folded more preflop and on the flop at 5% rake, so the hands that survived to the river are stronger on average but fewer in number. CO responds to this narrower calling field in two ways: (1) value hands shift to smaller bet sizes because CO doesn't need to price out a wide range — a smaller bet extracts efficiently from what BB does hold; (2) hands that would have checked at 0% rake now bet, because BB folds the river more often, making bluffs and thin-value bets profitable. Falsifier: if the frequency rise were driven purely by BB-range narrowing (a passive effect), we'd expect frequency AND size to move in the same direction. They move in opposite directions, implying an active CO-side range change.

Effect 1 pulls average bet down. Effect 2 pushes bet frequency up. Net result: CO bets the river 91.3% of the time, but for a smaller amount.

This finding is directionally confirmed across three additional runouts tested in later phases — A94r → Js → 2d, T98 → Jc → 2d, and the rainbow control Ks5d2h → 8c → 7h all show frequency rising and average size falling at 5% rake. The mechanism is not runout-specific. (See Research notes for a monotone-board caveat.)

What this means in practice: At 5% rake, do not assume river thin value bets are worse. They may be better — your opponent reaches the river less often, so when you do bet, they fold at a higher rate and you need less sizing to get called by the hands they do hold. Bet more often on the river at high rake, but size down slightly.

4.5 The 2%/2cap anomaly

One rake configuration does not behave like the others.

At 2%/2cap, BB defense widens to 56.1% — above both 0% (51.8%) and 3% (51.8%). BB call% rises to 44.9% (vs 39.2% at 0%). K72r c-bet jumps to 88.7% (vs 83.6% at 0%). The 2% row is consistently wider than both bounding configurations.

This is not a measurement error. All four rake settings produce distinct cache keys (confirmed via direct investigation). The behavior is genuine, but the reason 2%/2cap specifically produces a call-heavy equilibrium — when both 0% and 3% produce identical results — remains unexplained.

2%/2cap data is excluded from all analysis in this chapter. The 0%, 3%, and 5% rows form a coherent, monotonic pattern (flat from 0% to 3%, then compressing at 5%). The 2% row breaks that pattern in a way that cannot be explained by any tested mechanism. Until the anomaly is resolved, treat 2%/2cap numbers as unreliable reference points.

4.6 Why the 0% and 3% rows are identical

The Cash 1.1.0 baseline model was trained and queried at 3%/3cap rake. When the research queried the same model at 0%/0cap, the returned values match the 3% baseline exactly — they are the same model state.

This is expected behavior, not a measurement error. The two rows represent the same trained equilibrium. The meaningful comparison is between this shared baseline and the 5%/5cap configuration, which produces distinctly different strategy output. All claims in this chapter derive from the 0%/3% baseline versus 5% delta.

What we didn't test in Ch 4

  • Intermediate rake levels (3.01%–4.99%): The jump from 3% to 5% is the only tested interval above baseline. The sensitivity threshold — the rake level at which BB defense starts compressing — could sit anywhere in that range.
  • BTN and CO response to rake: Only BB defense and c-bet data were collected. We do not know whether CO or BTN adjust open sizes, limp frequencies, or 3-bet defense in response to rake. The §4.1 VPIP finding covers open frequency but not sizing or non-open actions.
  • River dynamics on other boards: The river bet/size finding (§4.4) is measured on K72r → 3d → 7c and confirmed directionally on three other runouts. A full board-texture × rake × river sweep has not been done.
  • Limped-pot rake dynamics: All data in this chapter comes from single-raised pots (CO opens, BB defends). Limped pots — where rake applies to different pot sizes and SPR conditions — are not covered.

Five practical adjustments

  1. Do not change your opening ranges for rake. Open VPIP moves less than 2pp across the full 0%–5% sweep at every position. The adjustment belongs to the defenders, not the openers.
  2. At 5% rake, tighten BB flat-calls by roughly 10pp. Marginal calling hands — suited gappers, weak suited aces, dominated broadways — should shift to fold or 3-bet. The 3-bet avoids the flop and avoids the rake.
  3. At 5% rake on dry boards, check back more marginal c-bets. K72r drops from 83.6% to 77.1%. A94r drops from 64.9% to 57.5%. Thin value c-bets become losers.
  4. At 5% rake on connected wet boards, c-bet more, not less. T98 rises from 59.5% to 65.1%. Your opponent folds more at high rake, so your c-bet achieves more fold equity on the boards where you'd normally get called wide.
  5. At 5% rake, bet the river more often but size down. River bet frequency rises from 60.3% to 91.3%. Average sizing drops from 25.5bb to 21.1bb. Your opponent's river calling range is narrow — bet smaller to extract from it, and bet more often because they fold at a higher rate.

Research notes

Details for readers interested in the methodology behind the findings above. Skip this section if you just want the practical takeaways.

  • 2%/2cap anomaly (MC-6a): documented, partially characterized, not resolved. The per-hand investigation identified the primary shift as 3-bet → call redistribution: 44 of 47 BB hands facing a CO open shift toward more calling at 2%/2cap, while 3 hands (T9s, 65s, 54s) shift toward more 3-betting. The earlier per-combo investigation (Batch 04e) was incomplete — hand_detail() iterates only 8 actionLabels, missing strategy array indices 8–10 where the primary 3-bet mass sits. The full picture was recovered by reading 11-element strategy arrays directly. The why — why 2%/2cap specifically triggers a call-heavy equilibrium when both 0% and 3% produce identical responses — remains unexplained. The proposed next-step investigation (per-hand pot-size distribution analysis at 2%/2cap vs 3%/3cap) has not been run. All theory claims in this chapter exclude 2% data and use only the 0%, 3%, and 5% rows.
  • River reversal (R-6): leading hypothesis confirmed directionally, mechanism partially verified. The call-suppression polarization hypothesis (M-10 in the mechanism registry) is supported by per-combo data on the K72r → 3d → 7c runout. Batch 04f confirmed that value hands (77, KQs) shift to smaller sizes at 5% rake while nut hands (KK, K9s) remain unchanged, and that frequency rises from check-back hands shifting to bets. The direction is preserved across 3 additional non-monotone runouts (A94r, T98, rainbow control). On one monotone runout (K94ss → 2c → 7h), the size direction partially reverses (+2.9bb at 5% rake). However, follow-up testing (6 K-high / Q-high monotone variants) found the reversal unstable under suit rotation: same cards in a different suit produce opposite behavior. The reversal is treated as a model-specific artifact rather than a clean strategic pattern. The direction-preserved claim applies to all tested non-monotone textures, and to 5 of 6 tested monotone variants.
  • Scope of the no-flop-no-drop rule. The game rules specify rake as a capped percentage of the pot charged only when a flop is dealt: float raked_amt = no_flop_dealt ? 0.0f : std::min(rake_cap_chips, ...) (reward_engineer.cc:318–319). This is the foundational rule behind the VPIP insensitivity in §4.1 and the call-suppression mechanism in §4.2. It is a [RULES-PURE] derivation from the training code — not an inference.
Ch 5

Compound Transitions

Single-axis findings are clean. You vary ante and hold everything else fixed; you vary depth and hold everything else fixed. The patterns are neat, monotonic, and easy to teach.

Real poker games are not neat. A Friday night 9-max game with a 2bb ante is not the 6-max zero-ante baseline plus a single adjustment. The ante interacts with the table size. Depth interacts with rake. The straddle interacts with depth. Each compound can amplify, cancel, or even reverse the effects you would predict from single-axis analysis alone.

This chapter covers five directly tested cross-axis interactions. Each section starts with a prediction, shows what actually happened, and explains the mechanism. The chapter ends with a summary matrix and three compound-format scenarios you are likely to encounter.

Measurement conditions: compound format combinations — see each table caption for the specific axes in play. Baseline where not varied: 6-max, 2-blind, 100bb effective, rake=3%/3cap.

5.1 Ante × blind structure: the straddle brake holds even at high antes

The prediction seemed obvious: at a large enough ante, the dead-money pool should be so massive that the straddle's squeeze threat becomes irrelevant. BTN in a 3-blind game at 2.5bb ante should approach BTN in a 2-blind game at 2.5bb ante — the squeeze threat drowns in dead money.

The prediction was partially confirmed and partially wrong.

BTN VPIP by ante level and blind structure. 6-max · 100bb effective · rake=3%/3cap · ante and blind structure both vary · BTN

BTN 2-blindBTN 3-blind
ante=043.3%28.9%
ante=1.0bb79.4%53.8%
ante=2.0bb96.4%74.7%
ante=2.5bb97.4%78.3%

Source: ch05-transitions.md §X-1 (re-analysis of ch01 batch 01a)

BTN VPIP: 2-blind vs 3-blind across four ante levels. 6-max · 100bb effective · rake=3%/3cap · ante and blind structure both vary · BTN

Chart: 2-blind BTN rises from 43.3% to 97.4% across the ante sweep. 3-blind BTN rises from 28.9% to 78.3%. The gap narrows from 14.4pp at 0 ante to ~19pp at 2.5bb ante — the straddle suppression persists and actually widens slightly in absolute terms.

Source: ch05-transitions.md §X-1 (re-analysis of ch01 batch 01a)

The widest cell in the entire table is 2-blind BTN at 2.5bb ante (97.4%), not 3-blind BTN at any ante level. Ante widens BTN; the straddle narrows BTN. These two forces pull in opposite directions, and the straddle wins — even at the highest ante tested, 3-blind BTN (78.3%) is still ~19pp below its 2-blind counterpart.

The gap does not close. It actually widens slightly in absolute terms as ante grows, from 14.4pp at zero ante to ~19pp at 2.5bb ante.

The compound runs differently by position

For UTG, MP, and CO, ante and blind structure pull in the same direction — both widen. The source notes that UTG goes from 17.2% to 44.5% in a 2-blind game at 2.5bb ante, and achieves a similar 44.5% in a 3-blind game at 2.5bb ante. The positive compound for early positions is real: ante widens their ranges, and the straddle's dead money adds a further incentive to open.

BTN is the exception because the straddle sits directly behind it. The straddle's squeeze threat discounts BTN's raise EV at every ante level — that discount is structural, not pot-size-dependent.

The all-in dynamic at 2.5bb ante + 3-blind

At 2.5bb ante in a 3-blind game, 19.1% of BTN's opens are all-in. The combination of the straddle squeeze threat plus the large ante pot creates near-jam-or-fold dynamics. BTN's choices in this format are: limp in, raise to near-jam sizes, or fold. There is no comfortable mid-size isolation raise.

Based on general poker theory Straddle squeeze suppression. The straddle's positional advantage — acting last preflop — creates a fixed discount to BTN's open-raise EV. This discount is structural (it depends on the straddle sitting behind BTN) not pot-dependent (it does not shrink when the pot gets larger from antes). Falsifier: if the discount were pot-dependent, BTN's 3-blind VPIP would converge to 2-blind VPIP at high antes. It does not — the ~19pp gap persists at 2.5bb ante.
The rule of thumb In a straddled game with any ante, do not assume dead money will compensate for the squeeze threat at BTN. Treat BTN as a constrained position regardless of ante level. Early positions (UTG/MP/CO) can open wider as ante grows in a straddled game — that compound is additive.

5.2 Depth × rake: deeper stacks are slightly more rake-sensitive

The prediction: BB's call% drop at 5% rake should be smaller at 600bb than at 100bb. The logic seemed solid — at 600bb the fixed rake cap (5bb) is a smaller fraction of larger pots, so rake should matter less.

The prediction was wrong.

BB call% at 0% and 5% rake by stack depth. 6-max · 2-blind · ante=0 · table size=6-max · depth and rake both vary · BB vs CO

0% rake call%5% rake call%Δ
100bb39.2%29.0%−10.2pp
600bb43.4%32.0%−11.4pp

Source: ch05-transitions.md §X-2 (Batch 05b)

The 600bb game shows more rake sensitivity (−11.4pp) than 100bb (−10.2pp). The cap-fraction argument is correct in isolation but misses the composition of BB's calling range at deep stacks.

Based on general poker theory No-flop-no-drop rake mechanics. At 600bb, BB's calling range is wider (43.4% vs 39.2% at 100bb) because implied odds justify calling with more speculative hands. Those extra calls — small pairs, suited connectors, weak suited aces — derive their EV from multi-street equity realization. Rake is charged every time a flop is dealt, and implied-odds hands see more flops across their calling tree. These are precisely the hands that sit near the breakeven threshold, and 5% rake pushes them below it. Falsifier: if the rake cap dominated the depth interaction, 600bb would show a smaller absolute call% drop. It shows a larger one.
The rule of thumb Do not assume deep-stack implied odds survive intact under high rake. The hands that benefit most from deep stacks (speculative implied-odds hands) are also the hands most damaged by rake. At 600bb + 5% rake, BB should be tighter than at 100bb + 5% rake, not the same.

5.3 Table size × depth: 9-max shows a slightly larger depth premium

The question: does BTN's depth-driven widening (100bb → 600bb) look the same at 9-max as at 6-max?

BTN VPIP by table size and depth. 2-blind · ante=0 · rake=3%/3cap · table size and depth both vary · BTN

100bb BTN VPIP600bb BTN VPIPΔ (depth effect)
6-max43.3%49.2%+5.9pp
9-max49.8%57.3%+7.5pp

Source: ch05-transitions.md §X-3 (Batch 05c)

The finding is confirmed but modest: 9-max BTN gains 7.5pp from depth versus 6-max BTN's 5.9pp. A 1.6pp difference.

At 9-max, BTN's range is already wider at 100bb (49.8% vs 43.3%) because seven prior folds weaken the remaining blind ranges. Going deeper at 9-max adds implied-odds hands on top of an already-loose baseline, producing a slightly larger absolute depth premium.

Raise sizes stay put. 9-max BTN opens to 2.2bb at both 100bb and 600bb. The implied-odds widening does not translate into larger sizing — the min-raise convention at larger tables holds regardless of depth.

The rule of thumb At a deep-stacked 9-max table, BTN should widen a few extra percentage points beyond what 6-max depth charts suggest. The effect is real but small. Do not overthink it — the bigger adjustments come from the single-axis effects (table size and depth independently).

5.4 Ante × table size: the most dramatic interaction in the book

This is where compound effects stop being modest.

The prediction: ante widens all positions, and the widening should be roughly proportional regardless of table size. Table size and ante operate on different dimensions — prior-fold count and dead money.

The prediction underestimated what happens when both dimensions are extreme simultaneously.

CO VPIP

CO VPIP by table size and ante. 2-blind · 100bb effective · rake=3%/3cap · table size and ante both vary · CO

6-max CO VPIP9-max CO VPIPΔ (larger table)
ante=0bb28.1%30.7%+2.6pp
ante=2bb80.0%85.4%+5.4pp

Source: ch05-transitions.md §X-4 (Batch 05d)

CO VPIP: 6-max vs 9-max at 0bb and 2bb ante. The gap more than doubles when ante is added. 2-blind · 100bb effective · rake=3%/3cap · table size and ante both vary · CO

Chart: At 0bb ante, 6-max CO (28.1%) and 9-max CO (30.7%) are close. At 2bb ante, the gap widens — 6-max CO reaches 80.0% while 9-max CO reaches 85.4%. The ante amplifies the positional premium more at the larger table.

Source: ch05-transitions.md §X-4 (Batch 05d)

At zero ante, 9-max CO is only 2.6pp wider than 6-max CO. At 2bb ante, the gap widens to 5.4pp. The ante effect is amplified at 9-max.

BTN raise sizes — the headline number

BTN average raise by table size and ante. 2-blind · 100bb effective · rake=3%/3cap · table size and ante both vary · BTN

6-max BTN avg raise9-max BTN avg raise
ante=0bb4.8bb2.2bb
ante=2bb13.8bb45.7bb

Source: ch05-transitions.md §X-4 (Batch 05d)

6-max BTN goes from 4.8bb to 13.8bb at 2bb ante — a 2.9× increase. 9-max BTN goes from 2.2bb to 45.7bb — a 20.8× increase.

This is not a quirk. The mechanism is arithmetic.

Based on general poker theory Dead-money pull. At 9-max with a 2bb ante, the pre-action pot contains 9 × 2bb in antes plus 3bb in blinds = 21bb before anyone opens. To deny BB reasonable pot odds to defend the ante pool, the opener needs to raise to roughly 2–3× pot. That is how you get raises in the 45bb range — it is the geometrically required size, not a bluff. Falsifier: if the raise-size scaling were a model training artifact rather than pot-geometry-driven, 6-max at the same ante would show a similar multiplier. It does not — 6-max shows 2.9× vs 9-max's 20.8×.

CO VPIP at 9-max + 2bb ante reaches 85.4% — nearly identical to BTN at 6-max + 2bb ante (96%). At a 9-max table with a 2bb ante, CO benefits from 7 prior folds AND the ante pool. The positional edge compounds with dead money at a larger table.

The rule of thumb If you sit down at a 9-max game with a 2bb ante and see BTN opening to 45bb, do not assume they are making a mistake. That is approximately the correct size for capturing a 21bb dead-money pool with fold equity. Do not call these opens with marginal hands expecting to win implied odds postflop — the pot-to-stack ratio is already compressed.

5.5 Rake × table size: larger tables are more rake-sensitive

The prediction: rake sensitivity should be similar across table sizes. Rake operates on individual hand EV, not table-level dynamics. A 5% rake is 5% whether six players or nine players sit at the table.

The prediction was wrong.

BB call% at 0% and 5% rake by table size. 2-blind · ante=0 · 100bb effective · table size and rake both vary · BB vs CO

0% rake call%5% rake call%Δ
6-max BB (vs CO)39.2%29.0%−10.2pp
9-max BB (vs CO)38.6%24.7%−13.9pp

Source: ch05-transitions.md §X-5 (Batch 05e)

9-max BB shows 36% more rake sensitivity than 6-max BB — a −13.9pp drop versus −10.2pp. Table size does amplify rake sensitivity.

Based on general poker theory No-flop-no-drop rake mechanics. At 9-max, the CO who opens has survived 7 prior folds. BB faces a stronger opener range than at 6-max (where only 2–3 players folded). A stronger opener range means BB's calling range is narrower — and more of that range sits near the breakeven boundary. Hands at the breakeven boundary are exactly the rake-sensitive category: profitable at 0% rake, losers at 5%. At 9-max, proportionally more of BB's calling range lives at this boundary. Falsifier: if rake sensitivity were table-size-independent, the absolute call% drop would be identical at 6-max and 9-max. It is not — 9-max drops 3.7pp more.

How this connects to the depth interaction

The §5.3 finding showed 9-max BTN gains 7.5pp from depth (100bb → 600bb). The §5.5 finding shows 9-max BB loses 13.9pp from 5% rake. At 9-max + 600bb + 5% rake, the rake contraction nearly cancels the depth premium. BB's call% at 9-max + 600bb + 5% rake is approximately 24.7% — close to the 9-max 100bb baseline without depth widening.

The rule of thumb In a 9-max game with 5% rake, tighten BB defense harder than you would at 6-max with the same rake. The adjustment is not 10pp (the 6-max number) — it is closer to 14pp. If you transition from a 6-max raked game to a 9-max raked game, BB's flatting range needs a second round of tightening.

5.6 The cross-axis picture at a glance

The five interactions above, plus the compound-format implications, form a single reference table. Interaction type classifies whether the two axes reinforce each other, oppose each other, or produce a non-linear compound.

Cross-axis interaction summary — tested compound effects. All interactions measured within the parametric Cash NLHE sweep. Baseline: 6-max, 2-blind, 100bb effective, 3%/3cap rake.

AxesInteraction typeDirectionKey finding
Ante × 3-blind (BTN)OpposingAnte ↑ VPIP; 3-blind ↓ VPIPAdditive not compound; 2-blind is always wider at high antes
Ante × 3-blind (UTG/MP/CO)CompoundingBoth ↑ VPIPUTG goes 17.2% → 44.5% at 2.5bb ante in both structures
Depth × rakeSlightly compoundingMore depth → slightly more rake-sensitivePrediction reversed: 600bb drop −11.4pp vs 100bb −10.2pp
Size × depthSlightly compounding9-max shows larger depth premium than 6-maxEffect small: +7.5pp vs +5.9pp
Ante × sizeAmplifyingLarger tables amplify ante effect more9-max CO gap widens 2.6pp → 5.4pp; BTN raise 20.8× at 9-max vs 2.9× at 6-max
Rake × sizeAmplifyingLarger tables are more rake-sensitive9-max BB drop −13.9pp vs 6-max −10.2pp at 5% rake

Source: ch05-transitions.md §Cross-axis interaction summary

The dominant pattern: axes that involve dead money (ante, rake, table size) amplify each other. Axes that involve positional mechanics (straddle) oppose dead-money axes at BTN specifically while compounding at other positions.

5.7 Compound format scenarios

Single-axis charts underpredict what happens in real-world formats because real formats combine multiple axes simultaneously. Here are three compound scenarios you are likely to encounter, with the specific adjustments the data supports.

"Big game" — high ante + straddle

Setup: 2bb+ ante, 3-blind structure (straddle at UTG), 100bb effective.

This is common in live high-stakes cash games. The combined effects from §5.1 and the single-axis chapters:

  1. UTG is dramatically wider. UTG goes from 17.2% (baseline) to 44.5% at 2.5bb ante + 3-blind. The ante overcomes the 3-blind's minor BTN-narrowing effect at early positions.
  2. BTN is wide but constrained. BTN reaches 78.3% at 2.5bb ante + 3-blind — wide, but still ~19pp below the 2-blind equivalent (97.4%). The straddle consistently acts as a brake on BTN width.
  3. BTN raise sizes are large. 19.6bb average at 2.5bb ante + 3-blind. Near-jams become standard BTN opens in this format (19.1% AI%).
  4. BB almost never folds. 92.7% defense at 2.5bb ante + 3-blind. Blind steals are ineffective.

The adjustment: Widen all preflop opens except BTN. Expect near-jam sizing from BTN and CO. BB defends nearly everything. Postflop is where value is realized — c-bet near 100% on dry boards with the pot already bloated by antes.

Deep stack + high rake — 5% rake, 600bb

The two effects partially counteract:

From §5.2, the rake sensitivity is larger at 600bb (−11.4pp) than at 100bb (−10.2pp). The implied-odds widening is outweighed by rake's damage to exactly those implied-odds hands.

The adjustment:

  1. BB calling range is tighter than the 100bb/3% baseline. From the source data: 32.0% calls at 600bb/5% rake, versus 39.2% at the standard baseline.
  2. BTN widens to ~49%+ VPIP at 600bb regardless of rake.
  3. River play stays aggressive — 5% rake does not suppress river betting. Expect overbets on dry boards at 600bb.
  4. Flop c-bet on dry boards drops from the 100bb baseline (depth effect from Ch 4) and drops further under 5% rake. Expect roughly 62% dry-board c-bet frequency at 600bb/5% rake.

Short-handed + deep — 4-max, 300bb+

The adjustment: UTG has more range flexibility than in any other table format. BTN opens extremely wide. BB calls very wide (close to HU-level defense at 4-max, widened further by implied odds). Postflop is SPR-controlled — flop bets are small relative to stacks; plan for river overbets starting around 500bb effective.

What we didn't test in Ch 5

These are compound interactions that were NOT directly measured. Do not extrapolate single-axis findings to these compounds — the X-2 and X-5 results show that intuitive extrapolation can be wrong.

  • Ante × rake (direct cross-tab). We know ante's single-axis effect and rake's single-axis effect, but did not test the 2×2 grid of {0bb, 2bb ante} × {0%, 5% rake} in a single batch. Whether ante amplifies or attenuates rake sensitivity is unknown from this chapter's data.
  • Ante × depth (direct cross-tab). We did not test {0bb, 2bb ante} × {100bb, 600bb} as a compound interaction. The Ch 3 single-axis depth findings and Ch 1 single-axis ante findings may not combine linearly.
  • 3-blind × depth (direct cross-tab). We tested 3-blind at 0bb ante × 100bb only in Ch 5. Whether the straddle squeeze suppression compounds differently at 600bb is not covered here.
  • 3-blind × rake (direct cross-tab). Same limitation — the straddle's effect under high rake was not tested as a compound in this chapter.

These four gaps are the highest-priority extensions for a future cross-axis batch. Until then, treat each axis independently and apply the §5.6 interaction-type classification as a directional guide, not a numeric prediction.

Five practical takeaways

  1. The straddle brake holds at any ante level. Even at 2.5bb ante, 3-blind BTN (78.3%) is ~19pp below 2-blind BTN (97.4%). Do not assume dead money drowns the squeeze threat — tighten BTN in straddled games regardless of ante.
  2. Deeper stacks are more rake-sensitive, not less. At 600bb + 5% rake, BB's call% drops −11.4pp versus −10.2pp at 100bb. Implied-odds hands are the first casualties because they incur multi-street rake. Tighten BB at deep + high-rake tables.
  3. 9-max + ante produces extreme sizing. At 9-max + 2bb ante, BTN averages a 45.7bb raise — a 20.8× increase from the 0-ante baseline. This is not a bluff; it is the pot-geometry-required size to get fold equity over a 21bb dead-money pool.
  4. Larger tables amplify rake sensitivity. 9-max BB loses 13.9pp at 5% rake versus 6-max BB's 10.2pp. At 9-max + 600bb + 5% rake, the rake contraction nearly cancels the depth premium. If you move from a 6-max raked game to a 9-max raked game, re-tighten BB.
  5. Cross-axis effects are not additive — they are interactive. Single-axis charts systematically underpredict compound formats. The strongest compound in the book is 3-blind + 600bb (BTN at 19.8%, from the Ch 4 depth × straddle finding) — larger than any single-axis effect on BTN. Always check for interaction effects before applying single-axis adjustments to a new format.

Research notes

Details for readers interested in the methodology behind the findings above. Skip this section if you just want the practical takeaways.

  • §5.1 data is re-analysis, not a new batch. The ante × blind structure cross-tab uses data from the Ch 1 batch (01a). No new queries were run for this interaction — the cells already existed in the original 2-blind vs 3-blind × ante sweep. The finding was extracted by cross-tabulating existing data.
  • §5.2 and §5.3 used dedicated compound batches. Depth × rake (05b) and table size × depth (05c) were purpose-built batches in the Ch 5 run, querying the specific 2×2 cells needed for each interaction test.
  • §5.4 and §5.5 expanded the batch count. Ante × table size (Batch 05d) and rake × table size (Batch 05e) were fully new batches added after the original ch01–ch04 run. These were the reason the total batch count for the book grew from the original ch01–ch04 set to include the Ch 5 compounds. The 45.7bb BTN avg raise at 9-max + 2bb ante is a direct output from Batch 05d — it was not extrapolated from single-axis data.
  • The 60bb figure in earlier reporting. An earlier analysis (hypotheses-and-mechanisms.md §M-11) reported 9-max BTN avg raise at 2bb ante as 60bb. The format-transitions-theory.md (v1.2.0) correction notes this was based on single-axis extrapolation; the direct compound batch (Batch 05d in ch05-transitions.md) measures 45.7bb. Both the Batch 05d table in §X-4 and the format-transitions-theory Part II Compound D use the 45.7bb figure. The CO VPIP figures from Batch 05d (6-max CO: 80.0%; 9-max CO: 85.4%) also come from the direct compound batch, superseding any extrapolated estimates. The delta values cited in §X-4 (gap widening from +2.6pp at 0 ante to +5.4pp at 2bb ante) are derived from these batch-measured cells.
  • The "What we didn't test" gaps are now partially covered by later batches. The four untested compounds listed in §"What we didn't test" (ante × rake, ante × depth, 3-blind × depth, 3-blind × rake) were tested in the v1.1.0 extension batches documented in the second half of ch05-transitions.md (X-6 through X-9) and in hypotheses-and-mechanisms.md (M-13, M-14, M-16, M-20). Those results are covered in Chapters 6–7 of this book. The gaps listed here apply specifically to the original Ch 5 compound batch set (X-1 through X-5).
  • Mechanism labels. The mechanisms referenced in this chapter correspond to the following entries in the research registry: dead-money pull (M-1), positional dead-money dilution (M-2), straddle squeeze suppression (M-3), MDF compression (M-4), call-suppression and 3-bet polarization under rake (M-8), ante × table-size amplification (M-11), rake × table-size amplification (M-12). All carry single-checkpoint status.

Further reading

The format-transitions findings are grounded in foundational GTO theory about pot geometry, stack-to-pot ratio, dead money, and rake effects. None of our specific numbers come from these works — they come from our own solver measurements — but the concepts are built on the theoretical foundations these authors established.

Modern GTO treatment of No-Limit Hold'em

Foundational poker mathematics

AI and poker — peer-reviewed research